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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
CHARLES LEE DIVINEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020220-CA 
On appeal, Appellant Charles Diviney has raised two issues. The first issue 
concerns a clerical error in the "Judgment, Sentence." Diviney entered a guilty plea to 
"burglary," aggravated assault, and three misdemeanor offenses. Thereafter, the trial 
court entered judgment against Diviney for "aggravated burglary," aggravated assault, 
and three misdemeanor offenses. (See Brief of Appellant, dated August 7, 2003, at 8-
15.) The judgment for "aggravated burglary" is incorrect. The state has acknowledged 
that error, and has agreed that the judgment should be corrected. (See State's Brief of 
Appellee ("State's Brief) at 11-12 (agreeing that the trial court incorrectly entered 
judgment and sentence for "aggravated burglary" rather than "burglary").) This Court 
may remand the case for that correction. 
The second issue concerns restitution. Diviney has asked this Court to vacate part 
of the restitution amount ordered by the trial court. Specifically, the court ordered 
Diviney to reimburse Crime Victims' Reparations ("CVR") for amounts that CVR paid 
to Deborah Diviney for lost wages and personal property. That order is in error in three 
ways. First, the trial court incorrectly computed the restitution for lost wages. (Brief of 
Appellant at 18.) The state acknowledges that error. (State's Brief at 14-17.) Thus, this 
Court may vacate that restitution amount and remand the matter for a correct calculation. 
Second, the trial court erroneously awarded restitution for amounts in lost wages 
that Deborah would not have earned; and third, the restitution amount relating to 
personal property is erroneously high. (Brief of Appellant at 15-27.) The state disagrees 
with Diviney's analyses regarding those matters. (State's Brief at 17-25.) Thus, they are 
further addressed here. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c) (2003); infra, pp. 2-17, herein. 
The state also claims that Diviney did not preserve the restitution issue for appeal. 
(State's Brief at 22.) That claim is inadequately briefed. In addition, the record fails to 
support the state's claims, as further explained below. See infra, p. 10, n.3 & pp. 17-19. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LAW SUPPORTS DIVINEY'S POSITION THAT THE 
RESTITUTION AWARD REIMBURSING CVR FOR "CHARGE OFF" 
DAYS AND PERSONAL PROPERTY/SECURITY EXPENSES IS 
IMPROPER. 
A. SINCE DEBORAH TESTIFIED THAT SHE HAS NEVER WORKED AT 
THE SCHOOL DISTRICT ON "CHARGE OFF" DAYS, THE AMOUNTS 
RELATING TO THOSE PURPORTED LOST WAGES MAY NOT BE 
INCLUDED IN THE RESTITUTION CALCULATION. 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, in this case, the trial court ordered Diviney 
to reimburse CVR for amounts in lost wages paid to Deborah. (Brief of Appellant at 16.) 
The trial court included amounts that - according to historical data - Deborah would not 
2 
have earned even if she had not suffered an injury in connection with the crimes in this 
case. (Brief of Appellant at 15-23.) That was improper. (Id.) 
To reiterate, C VR officer Christine Ackmann testified at the restitution hearing 
that CVR compensated Deborah for work days missed at the school district due to an 
injury she suffered in the assault on June 14, 2000.{ (See R. 292:10-13; Brief of Appel-
lant at 15-23.) The days missed totaled 41 and included June 30, 2000; July 31, 2000 
(see notes 1 & 2); August 31, 2000; September 29, 2000; October 27, 2000; November 
30, 2000; January 30, 2001; February 28, 2001; March 30, 2001; April 30, 2001; 
May 31, 2001; June 29, 2001; and July 18, 2001 (see notes 1 & 2). (R. 292:10-13.) 
The days listed above are not actual work days at the school for Deborah. That is, 
with the exception of July 18, 2001, the above days were "charge off' days. (R. 292:48-
53 (Deborah acknowledged that she regularly took the last day of each month off work at 
the school district to work at Discover Card); State's Brief at 17, n. 14 (acknowledging 
that all but two of the above dates are "charge off days).) 
Deborah testified that on "charge off' days, it was her regular practice to work 
'At the time of the injury (June 14, 2000), Deborah worked two jobs. She worked 
in a lunchroom for Granite School District (R. 292:55 (f,I work at a year-around school, 
but we are off during the month of July")), and she worked as a senior account manager 
at Discover Card. (R. 292:39.) Deborah received paid time off at Discover Card (R. 292: 
36). Also, she could take leave from work without jeopardizing her job there. (R. 
292:36, 53.) CVR did not compensate Deborah for days missed at Discover Card. 
However, since Deborah did not receive paid time off at the school district, CVR 
compensated her for days that she missed there due to her injury and to matters relating 
to this case. 
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only at Discover Card. (R. 292:61-62, also 292:48-49.) For years prior to the injury in 
this case, and since recovery, she never worked at the school district on "charge off 
days. (See R. 292:61-62.) Even when Discover Card changed its policy six months 
before the June-14 injury to allow for late payment postings on "charge off days, 
Deborah continued to take that day off from work at the school district. In short, she 
never worked at the school district on "charge off days. (R. 292:61-65; see. also R. 
292:67-68 (after recovering from her injuries, Deborah continued with her routine and 
regular practice of taking the last day of each month off work from the school district in 
order to work at Discover Card).) For Deborah, "charge off days at the school district 
were like weekends in that she did not work them, injury or not. 
Thus, Deborah was not entitled to restitution for lost wages for "charge off days. 
(Brief of Appellant at 15-23.) The evidence fails to support "actual" economic or work 
loss for those days. (See id); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-20l(l)(c), (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001) 
("special damages" are recoverable in restitution; "not general damages"); 77-3 8a-102(6) 
(Supp. 2001) (same); 63-25a-41 l(4)(d) (Supp. 2003) (specifying that reparations may be 
made to a victim of crime for "actual loss of past earnings"); State v. Corbitt 2003 UT 
App 417, Tfll, 82 P.3d 211 (discussing "actual" losses in restitution). In this case, it was 
error for the trial court to award restitution to CVR (as assignee to Deborah's claims) for 
wages relating to "charge off days. (Brief of Appellant, at 17-23.) 
The state disagrees with Diviney's analysis. According to the state, the fact that 
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Deborah historically did not work on "charge off days is "of little relevance" in determi-
ning special damages. (State's Brief at 19.) The state claims Deborah had "little, if any, 
opportunity" to establish a history prior to the injury here. (Id.) Yet, Deborah's histori-
cal, routine practice at all times prior to the injury and after recovery constitutes clear 
evidence of "actual" work and "actual" wages for calculating restitution here. 
Since Deborah never worked "charge off days at the school district, either before 
the injury or after recovery (R. 292:62, 67-68), the amounts in purported wages for those 
days do not constitute "actual" lost wages. They are not recoverable against Diviney as 
restitution. (See Brief of Appellant, at 19-23 (citing, inter alia, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-
25a-402(38) (Supp. 2003) (defining "work loss" for victims' reparations); 63-25a-
41 l(4)(d) (specifying that reparations may be made to a victim of crime for "actual loss 
of past earnings" and anticipated future earnings).)2 
2
 With respect to Deborah's compensation for days off in July, the state seems to 
claim that compensation was appropriate even though Deborah acknowledged that the 
year-around school was closed that month. (See. State's Brief at 17, n.14.) According to 
the state, Deborah is entitled to the compensation because "there is no record evidence 
concerning how Granite employees were paid: whether they were paid only during the 
times they worked, or whether their salaries were adjusted to permit for paychecks to be 
issued during the entire year, regardless of when the school was closed." (Id.) 
That argument is illogical. If paychecks were "adjusted to permit for paychecks to 
be issued" (kL) each month of the year, that means the school was making the adjustment 
because it was closed in July; teachers and staff did not work then, yet they received 
"adjusted" paychecks based on their work for the remaining months of the year. 
Whether Deborah received only one paycheck per year for all services performed, 
or 24 checks equally disbursed over a 12-month period does not change the fact that she 
did not work in July when the year-around school was closed. The evidence on that point 
was presented specifically to the trial court. (R. 292:55.) Thereafter, the court ordered 
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The state also seems to claim that if Deborah had not been injured, she could have 
worked both the school district shift on "charge off days, and at Discover Card "if she 
choose [sic] to do so." (State's Brief at 18.) The state seems to argue that Deborah (or 
CVR as the assignee) may recover damages for lost opportunity, i.e. "general damages," 
as part of restitution. (State's Brief at 17-20.) That argument is not supported by the 
law. (See Brief of Appellant at 15-23 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(c), (4)(a)(i) 
(allowing for "special damages" in restitution); First Sec. BanL N.A. v. Banberrv 
Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that "special damages" require 
proof that the injured party's loss has been realized or liquidated); Utah Code Ann. §§ 
63-25a-402(38) (Supp. 2003), -41 l(4)(d) (specifying that reparations may be made to a 
victim of crime for "actual loss of past earnings" and anticipated future earnings); 
Washington v. American Community Stores Corp.. 244 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Neb. 1976) 
(recognizing that loss of actual past earnings constitutes "special damages," while "loss 
of earning capacity" is a "general" damage claim); Delphen v. Dep't of Transp. & Dev.. 
657 So. 2d 328, 336 (La. App.) (recognizing that loss of "earning capacity" is not 
determined by "actual loss"; also, it is not "pecuniary loss"), cert, denied, 663 So.2d 717 
restitution for all work loss days requested by the state. (R. 293:6-7; 292:24 (state and 
Ackmann identified only 5 ineligible work-loss days in May 2000, predating the crimes); 
Case No. 001912025 ("Case 2025") at 185-86; Case 2025 at 192 (court ordered 
restitution based on the state's requests).) The trial court's order included work loss for 
days in July 2000 and 2001. Since Deborah did not work at all in July, the amount for 
lost wages contains a miscalculation. This Court may correct the matter here or remand it 
for proper calculation of the amounts. See also infra, p. 10 n. 3. 
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(La. 1995)).) 
Utah law does not allow recovery for lost opportunity in restitution. The 
legislature intended limits on amounts recoverable, particularly for lost wages. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-3-20 l(l)(c), (4)(a)(i) (stating that pecuniary damages are recoverable in 
restitution, and defining pecuniary damages as "special damages," "not general 
damages"); 63-25a-41 l(4)(d) (specifying that reparations may be made to a victim of 
crime for "actual loss of past earnings"). Thus, as stated above, the victim's "actual" 
work history becomes relevant in determining "actual" loss of past earnings. 
Consider the following example: suppose every winter for a number of years prior 
to the wrist injury, a local ski resort asked Deborah to operate ski lifts on weekends for a 
specific amount in wages. Although Deborah's schedule with the school and Discover 
Card would accommodate the weekend seasonal job, each year she turned down the extra 
wages and chose not to do the work. Suppose the resort approached Deborah with the 
same opportunity while her wrist was injured and for the year after recovery. Again 
Deborah declined the extra wages and work. She claimed that during the injury period, it 
would have been impossible: Loading lifts would cause pain and swelling to her wrist. 
Deborah also claimed that during the injury period, she was denied the opportunity and 
the choice to earn the extra wages. After recovery, Deborah could have done the extra 
work, but she chose not to. 
Under the hypothetical, Deborah would not be entitled to restitution for the extra 
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wages she did not earn during the injury period. Those wages would not qualify as 
actual loss of past earnings. See New York State Depart, of Audit and Control v. Crime 
Compensation Board, 431 N.Y.S.2d 598, 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (determining that 
crime victim had no actual loss of earnings where he was unemployed for 8 months prior 
to the crime); Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-41 l(4)(d) (reparations may be made to a victim 
of crime for "actual loss of past earnings"). They would qualify only as lost opportunity 
or general damages. Washington, 244 N.W.2d at 289 ("loss of earning capacity" is a 
"general" damage claim); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-20l(l)(c), (4)(a)(i) ("general 
damages" are not recoverable in restitution). Even though a specific amount in wages 
may be identified for ski-lift operators, in the hypothetical, Deborah historically never 
worked the seasonal job or earned the extra wages. 
As in the hypothetical, in the hearing in this case, Deborah's work history identi-
fied amounts compensable for "actual" work loss. That history does not support that 
Deborah may recover lost wages for "charge off days and days in July that she routinely 
and normally did not work at the school district. Those amounts may not be included in 
the restitution order. 
Finally, the state does not dispute that the law requires a person seeking repara-
tions to mitigate damages. (See State's Brief at 20-21); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-
25a-402(38) (stating that recoverable income will be reduced by amount in wages for 
reasonable employment that victim failed to undertake). Nevertheless, the state 
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maintains that here, "Deborah met the mitigation requirement by getting out and working 
despite her injuries." (State's Brief at 21.) The state's argument misses the point. 
In this case, Deborah testified that she was required to use her injured wrist to per-
form tasks for both jobs at Discover Card and the school district. Deborah also testified 
that every day but "charge off day, she could work both jobs. (See 292:60.) On "charge 
off days, the work at Discover Card was particularly intense and "stressful." (Compare 
R. 292:59 (stating that the work at Discover Card on "charge off days was constant, 
precise and stressful on her wrist); with R. 292:60 (stating that she continuously used her 
wrist for work at the school district).) Yet, she worked at Discover Card on those days. 
Deborah could take paid leave from work on "charge off days at Discover Card. 
(R. 292:36, 53.) She could not take paid leave from her job with the school district. 
Nevertheless, Deborah chose to work at Discover Card on "charge off days and then 
requested compensation from CVR for wages from the school district even though she 
normally would not have worked at the school on those days. That is not mitigation. 
In this case, the trial court disregarded the law when it allowed restitution for 
amounts CVR paid to Deborah in connection with "charge off days. That constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah 1989) Oudge's 
discretion in sentencing lies within the limits prescribed by law); State v. Jolivet, 712 
P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986) (discretion in sentencing is limited by the law); State v. 
Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219-20 (Utah 1984) (statutory law prescribes the bounds of 
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the trial court's discretion). 
The court abused its discretion in two respects: First, Deborah was not entitled to 
"lost wages" for "charge off days and days worked in July, since those wages do not 
constitute actual or special damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(c), (4)(a)(i) 
(limiting restitution to pecuniary or "special damages"). Second, and alternatively, 
Deborah was not entitled to lost wages where she failed to properly mitigate. Either 
argument may serve as a basis for vacating the trial court's ruling as it relates to 
compensation for "charge off days and days worked in July.3 
B. THE AMOUNT IN RESTITUTION FOR PERSONAL PROPERTY/ 
SECURITY IS IMPROPER AND BASED ON A MISCALCULATION. 
1. Divinev's Opening Brief Correctly Calculates the Amount in Restitution for 
"Personal Property" Expenses Relating to Security. 
3
 The state asserts that Diviney "did not preserve his challenges to the amounts 
ordered for lost wages generally". (State's Brief at 4.) That statement is incorrect. (See 
R. 293:6 (defense counsel objected to restitution amounts in prosecutor's brief).) It also 
is in conflict with other claims in the State's Brief, where the state asserts that defendant 
preserved the argument relating to "'charge off days." (See State's Brief at 17.) 
According to the record, Diviney preserved the issues below. Specifically, the 
record here shows that defendant objected to restitution and requested a hearing at 
sentencing (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (requiring defendant to request a 
restitution hearing at sentencing); R. 408:12-13 (at sentencing Diviney objected to 
restitution and requested a hearing)); and he participated in several proceedings on 
restitution in the trial court. (R. 410, 292, 293.) Also, the trial court ruled specifically on 
each restitution amount and issue. (Case 2025 at 191-92.) Diviney has properly 
preserved the issues relating to lost wages. This Court may decide the issues on the 
merits. Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'a 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App.) ("A matter 
is sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an 
opportunity to rule on the issue"), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). 
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Next, Diviney has challenged the trial court's order that he reimburse CVR in the 
amount of $916 for Deborah's personal property expenses. (See Case 2025 at 192; Brief 
of Appellant, 23-27.) Diviney maintains the amount is erroneously high. The restitution 
order should be modified to reflect only costs relating to and incurred after the crimes in 
this case. (Brief of Appellant, 27.) 
To explain, in May 2000, Deborah incurred costs for securing her home at 1767 
West Hazelhurst. She changed garage and door locks and codes, and she repaired a 
sliding glass door. (See Brief of Appellant at 24-25; R. 292:10.) On June 9, 2000, 
Deborah purchased and paid for installation of an alarm service. (See 292:17.) She also 
signed a contract to have her home monitored for one year, with payments apparently to 
be made in installments. (See R. 292:21-22, 17-18.) CVR compensated Deborah for the 
security costs predating the crimes. (See R. 292:14-18 (CVR paid "$494" and "$82" for 
security/monitoring costs incurred at Hazelhurst prior to the crimes in this case).) 
In July 2000, the state charged Diviney with committing crimes on June 14, 2000, 
at 2075 East Harvest Park Court (Case No. 001911430 ("Case 1430") at 2-4), and on 
July 11, 2000, at 6662 South Royal Harvest Way. (Case 2025 at 2-4, 19-22.) 
On June 28, Deborah installed a deadbolt for $189.30. (R. 292:15.) On July 12, 
she installed an alarm system at her son's home on South Royal Harvest Way. 
(R. 292:33-34.) Deborah testified that the alarm system for the South Royal Harvest 
address was donated and installed for free. (R. 292:34.) She was required to pay only 
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for a remote control, which was $237, and for monitoring services in the amount of 
$124. (See R. 292:34,21-23.) CVR compensated Deborah for those expenses. 
In total, CVR paid Deborah $1,044.37Tor security at Hazelhurst and South Royal 
Harvest. (Brief of Appellant at 24; R. 292:7, 14.) The trial court in turn ordered Diviney 
to reimburse CVR in the amount of $961. (Case 2025 at 192.) That amount is incorrect. 
In determining restitution here, Diviney has looked to the evidence and calculated 
costs incurred after the crimes at the relevant properties. Those costs total $361. (Brief 
of Appellant at 23-27.) Diviney's calculation is appropriate, since costs predating or 
unrelated to the crimes are not recoverable in restitution. See State v. Bicklev, 2002 UT 
App 342, ^|12, 60 P.3d 582 (defendant cannot be required to pay restitution for amounts 
predating crimes); State v. Mast 2001 UT App 402, ^|24, 40 P.3d 1143; see also State v. 
Watson, 1999 UT App 273,1J5, 987 P.2d 1289. 
In response to Diviney's argument on appeal, the state does not take issue with the 
law. In fact, the state acknowledges that the prosecutor did not intend to include costs 
predating the crimes, including "the cost of buying and installing the first alarm system in 
Deborah's primary residence on Hazelhurst ($494.00) or the cost of the first service 
payment ($82)" in the restitution amount. (State's Brief at 24.) The state also asserts that 
the prosecutor and trial court intended to omit "from the final restitution calculation the 
purchase and installation of the system prior to the June 14 incident as well as the first 
maintenance payment" (State's Brief at 24.) For restitution, the state identifies an 
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adjustment for reimbursement to CVR for personal property costs in the amount of $576 
($494 plus $82). (Id) 
Diviney agrees in relevant part with the state's claims regarding adjustments in the 
amounts for personal property. (But see infra, pp. 15-16, herein.) Yet, review of the 
record here supports that the trial court did not make the proper adjustments. Indeed, the 
trial court relied on a "Brief on Restitution Issues" filed by the prosecutor. (See Case 
2025 at 192 (the trial court's order reflected amounts calculated by the prosecutor in the 
"Brief on Restitution Issues").) The prosecutor's calculations for personal property 
expenses as set forth in the "Brief on Restitution Issues" are erroneously high. 
Specifically, where the record supports that CVR compensated Deborah in the 
total amount of $1,044.37 for installation of the alarm systems, monitoring services, and 
other security matters (R. 292:7, 14-17), the prosecutor identified the total amount in the 
"Brief on Restitution Issues" as $1,447. (Case 2025 at 186.) The difference between 
the actual amount ($1,044) and the erroneous amount in the prosecutor's Brief ($1,447) 
is approximately $403. (See R. 292:7, 14 (admitting that CVR compensated Deborah in 
the amount of $1,044.37 for personal property expenses).) The miscalculation compels 
the determination that the restitution order here must be adjusted. 
Next, as Diviney maintained in the opening brief, and as the state has 
acknowledged (see State's Brief at 24 (recognizing that the prosecutor and trial court 
intended to omit "from the final restitution calculation" the costs incurred prior to June 
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14)), Diviney cannot be required to pay restitution for costs incurred by Deborah, which 
predated the crimes in the case. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^[12. 
According to the evidence, the costs incurred prior to June 14 related to the 
Hazelhurst property; those costs totaled $576 ($494 plus $82). (R. 292:14-17; see State's 
Brief at 24.) In the "Brief on Restitution Issues," the prosecutor again miscalculated the 
amounts. He erroneously identified the "non-qualifying" fees as "$449 plus $82." (Case 
2025 at 186.) By transposing the numbers ("$449M for "$494"), the prosecutor's 
adjustment was erroneous. The difference between the actual deductions ($494 plus 
$82) and the prosecutor's calculations ($449 plus $82) is $45. Thus, the restitution order 
again must be adjusted. 
In this case, the prosecutor began with an erroneously high number ($1,447 versus 
$1,044) and reduced it by an erroneously low number ($531 versus $576) to calculate 
restitution (Case 2025 at 186), while Diviney has simply looked to the evidence to 
calculate the amounts. (Brief of Appellant at 23-27.) Diviney's calculations are correct. 
There is still more to the analysis. As stated above, CVR's compensation to 
Deborah totaled $1,044.37. (R. 292:7, 14.) According to the evidence, that amount 
included $494 in non-qualifying fees for the alarm system and monitoring at Hazelhurst 
(seeR. 292:14-17); $189.30 for a deadbolt (R. 292:15); $124 for monitoring services 
from July to October at the South Royal Harvest address (R. 292:21, 34); and $237 for a 
remote control and alarm system at South Royal Harvest Way. (R. 292:16, 20, 34.) 
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Those amounts total $1,044.30. That is what CVR paid to Deborah. (R. 292:7, 14.) 
While Ackmann testified that CVR also compensated Deborah in the additional 
amount of $82 for costs predating the crimes (see R. 292:17), that amount does not seem 
to factor into the total of $1,044. Stated another way, either Ackmann already reduced 
the amount by $82 when she identified the total as $1,044.37; or the $82 is part of the 
$494-contract price predating the crimes in this case. Thus, the trial court should not 
have identified additional reductions in restitution in the amount of $82. 
Consider the final breakdown, according to Ackmann and Deborah, as follows: 
Amounts paid by CVR to Deborah Dates costs were incurred 
$494 (alarm/monitoring at May 2000; June 9, 2000 
Hazelhurst, including (R. 292:15-17, 21-22) 
monitoring for June, Sept.) 
$189.30 (deadbolt) June 28, 2000 (R. 292:15) 
$124 (monitoring service for July 12,2000 (R, 292:16, 
July to Oct. at Royal Harvest) 21-23,34) 
$237 (security remote control/ July 12,2000 (R. 292:22-23,34) 
installation at Royal Harvest) 
Total: $1,044.37 (Total amount that CVR paid to Deborah (292:7,14)). 
In the end, once the prosecutor's miscalculations are corrected (see supra, pages 
11-14), the only amount in dispute here relates to installation of the deadbolt ($189). 
That is, the state admits the calculation for personal property must be reduced by $494 
(State's Brief at 24), and Diviney acknowledges restitution in the amount of $361 ($124 
plus $237) for costs at South Royal Harvest Way after July 11, 2000. (Brief of Appellant 
at 27; Case 2025 at 19-22 (alleging crimes on July 11 at South Royal Harvest Way).) 
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However, Diviney maintains that the deadbolt costs are not recoverable in restitu-
tion. According to the record, those costs were incurred at the Hazelhurst address. (R. 
292:10 (Deborah incurred costs for doors and locks at Hazelhurst).) The crimes in this 
case did not occur at Hazelhurst (see Case 2025 at 19-22; Case 1430 at 2-4). Also, 
security at Hazelhurst did not relate to this case. (See R. 292:32-33.) Further, Diviney 
did not admit responsibility for crimes at that address. (R. 291.) Thus, the costs relating 
to the deadbolt may not be included in the restitution order. (Brief of Appellant at 23-27); 
see Mast, 2001 UTApp 402, Ifijl 1-15. 
The state disagrees and claims the deadbolt may have been installed at the South 
Royal Harvest address. (See State's Brief at 23, n.15.) Assuming arguendo that were 
true, that expense would not be recoverable in restitution since the deadbolt costs predate 
the crimes at South Royal Harvest Way. (See R. 291:8-12 (admitting to crimes at South 
Royal Harvest Way on July 11); 292:15 (deadbolt costs incurred on June 28, predating 
the crimes at South Royal Harvest Way)); Bicklev. 2002 UT App 342, f 12 (costs 
predating crimes were not recoverable in restitution); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(c), 
(4)(a)(i) (allowing restitution for special damages resulting from criminal activity). 
Based on the evidence, this Court may arrive at the amount in restitution set forth 
in the opening Brief of Appellant. Specifically, Diviney may be ordered to reimburse 
CVR in the amount of $361 ($124 plus $237) for payments made to Deborah for security 
at the South Royal Harvest address after July 11. (See Brief of Appellant at 27.) 
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In sum, the trial court's restitution order for personal property appears to be based 
on the prosecutor's miscalculations rather than actual amounts paid by CVR to Deborah. 
(Compare R. 292:7, 14-17, 20-23 (Ackmann identified amounts paid to Deborah for 
security costs), with Case 2025 at 186 (prosecutor identified an erroneous amount for the 
same).) In addition, the deadbolt costs are not recoverable in restitution. As set forth in 
the Brief of Appellant, Diviney requests that this Court vacate the amount in the court's 
restitution order for personal property, and remand the matter for proper calculation. 
2. The Restitution Issue Relating to Personal Property Was Properly Preserved. 
The state seems to claim that Diviney failed to properly preserve the argument for 
appeal relating to restitution costs for personal property. The state asserts, the "defendant 
did not raise [the] argument below [regarding security at Hazelhurst] when he mentioned 
installation of the burglar alarm' prior to the first offense (R. 293:3), and he made no 
other specific objection to payment of the post-June 14 service fee for the alarm system". 
(State's Brief at 22.) The state's argument lacks reasoned analysis and must be rejected. 
See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) 
(2003) (requiring adequate briefing); State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (rejecting state's arguments where they were inadequately briefed). 
The state's argument also is misplaced. According to Utah law, the preservation 
rule serves to ensure that the trial court is "given an opportunity to address a claimed error 
and, if appropriate, correct it.'" State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, HI 1, 10 P.3d 346. Here, 
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that purpose was served. At sentencing, the court ordered Diviney to pay restitution. 
Diviney requested a hearing. (See R. 408:12-13 (at sentencing Diviney objected to 
restitution and requested a hearing).) The hearing was for the trial court's benefit. 
During the hearing, Ackmann testified that CVR compensated Deborah for costs 
incurred for securing the Hazelhurst property prior to the crimes in this case. (R. 292:14-
18, 20-23.) Diviney then argued that amounts relating to the Hazelhurst property and 
predating the crimes should not be included in the final restitution order. Diviney's coun-
sel argued that the improper amounts included claims "for reimbursements prior to the 
date of the offense of [June 14, 2000], that included the installation of the burglar alarm 
and some of the payments thereunder." (R. 293:3.) Counsel also stated the following: 
We believe that [Deborah] Diviney has simply seen an opportunity to - to pursue a 
course of- of being compensated for something indeed that she was not entitled to 
be compensated for. The Victim Reparations has - has, without question, paid 
every - every request that she's made without - it hasn't - it hasn't done an inves-
tigation and now we're here at the point where they're saying, okay, restitution is -
is appropriate for this. The testimony does not indicate that, and we would ask the 
Court to scrutinize the restitution with regards to how much is actually com-
pensable, if any, and award accordingly. Not just sit back and say, well, they've 
asked for this much money, therefore, I'm going to give it. It's inappropriate. 
There's no basis for - for a substantial portion of that money, Your Honor. 
(R. 293:6 (referring to claims for restitution identified in the prosecutor's "Brief on 
Restitution Issues").) 
The trial judge was apprised of the evidence and issues relating to restitution in 
this case. (R. 292, 293.) The trial court ruled on each aspect of restitution, including 
restitution in the amount of $916 for CVR "for payments made to [Deborah] Diviney for 
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the expense of installing an alarm system and the expense of quarterly fees associated 
with two alarm systems." (Case 2025 at 192.) The purpose of the preservation doctrine 
was served here. See Hart, 945 P.2d at 129 ("A matter is sufficiently raised if it is 
submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue"). 
The state's claim that the issue was not properly preserved is insupportable. This Court 
may decide the issue on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The state has acknowledged a clerical error in the entry of the sentence and 
judgment, and errors in the trial court's computation of restitution. (State's Brief at 12, 
17.) Diviney respectfully requests that this Court remand this case for correction of those 
matters. In addition, Diviney respectfully urges this Court to vacate the trial court's order 
of restitution as it relates to compensation for "charge off1 days and days worked in July, 
and as it relates to the miscalculations for amounts in restitution for personal property. 
Those amounts are incorrect and must be adjusted. 
Diviney is not incarcerated. Nevertheless, he requests that this Court resolve this 
matter promptly. In order to accommodate such a request, Diviney hereby submits the 
arguments on the briefs, pursuant to Rule 29(a)(3), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
SUBMITTED this L* day of A J M ^ ^ 2004. 
LINDA M.JONES /] 
SALT LAKE LEGAKDEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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